What Insights Can We Draw from the Census Data Regarding "The Lost Generation"?
Let’s face it: the narrative surrounding young white men today is complex and often controversial. A recent article by Jacob Savage in Compact Magazine highlights how rising discrimination against this demographic in various sectors might be fueling their feelings of alienation and leading them towards more conservative ideologies. Interestingly, as noted by Douthat in a response to Savage's piece, what sets Savage’s argument apart is its materialist perspective—focusing on tangible economic factors rather than just cultural influences like social media or podcasts, which are often discussed.
Savage makes several specific claims that can be more comprehensively analyzed through nationally representative economic surveys, rather than relying solely on the limited statistics he gathered from a few employers and educational institutions. I’ll delve into these aspects further.
To begin with, Savage’s examination centers on the experiences of white men in their thirties from 2014 to the present. Throughout this timeframe, this group constituted about 27-29% of all individuals in their thirties, with a noticeable decline in percentage during the later years.
A significant portion of Savage's arguments touches on education, so I calculated the percentage of non-Hispanic white men in their thirties who held a Bachelor’s degree (but not higher) over the same period. Back in 2013, roughly 24% of these men had earned a Bachelor’s degree. By 2024, this number rose to around 32%. In contrast, the general population began the period with approximately 23% holding only a Bachelor’s degree and concluded it with about 27% in the same category.
Next, I examined the segment of the population that possesses post-Bachelor’s degrees, such as Master’s, PhDs, or professional degrees. In both cases, white men and others started off at an equal level of approximately 13%. By 2024, the percentage for white men crept up slightly to about 14%, while the overall figure for everyone else increased to around 17%.
However, the bulk of Savage’s arguments extend beyond educational achievements; they delve into employment issues. To investigate this further, I looked at the percentage of thirty-something white men and their peers who were employed for fifty weeks or more each year. Between 2013 and 2019, both groups saw a steady rise in full-time employment rates as defined here. The onset of COVID-19 caused a dip in these figures, but they rebounded afterward—fully recovering for everyone else, though not completely for white men. By 2024, employment among thirty-something white men stood at 81%, marking a 3-point increase since 2013.
Yet, Savage's argument does not merely revolve around the availability of jobs for white men; it highlights their exclusion from certain high-ranking positions. To assess this, I calculated the percentage of thirty-something white men situated within the upper echelon of the earnings distribution. In 2013, around 69% of them fell into the top half of earners in this age group. By 2024, this number declined slightly to 67%. When we narrow it down to the top 20%, the figure dropped from 34% to 32%, and for the top 10%, it decreased from 19% to 16%.
However, it’s essential to note that Savage’s focus on high-status jobs primarily pertains to fields within the arts and media. To evaluate this aspect, I reviewed the percentages of white men and others employed in occupations related to "arts, design, entertainment, sports, and media" (codes 2600-2920). Notably, the proportions for both groups have remained unchanged since 2013.
In summary, the data does not substantiate Savage’s materialist thesis effectively. Young white men in their thirties have not experienced a significant decline in their prospects during this time. Their overall employment has risen, their participation in arts and media remains stable, and their educational achievements have improved. While there may be slight decreases in representation within the top 10% of earners, white men still occupy a disproportionately large share of these positions even at this age.
Ironically, Savage’s article—and its subsequent viral reception—might inadvertently bolster the non-material theories concerning the political behavior of young men, which emphasize the influence of the internet, podcasts, and memes. It appears that Savage, along with those who resonate with his sentiments, is reacting more to the mental and emotional impressions created by diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) messaging than to any substantial material changes in their circumstances. The institutions Savage critiques employ only a minuscule fraction of the U.S. workforce, yet the transformations occurring within them, combined with DEI rhetoric and an online community that amplifies negative narratives, can create a perception of a much larger crisis.
Consequently, this situation leads some individuals to question the qualifications and merits of minorities occupying prestigious roles (as noted by Clarence Thomas), attributing the inability of white men to secure similar positions to perceived discrimination. This sentiment can overflow into political beliefs and behaviors, despite the reality that the number of people genuinely affected by these dynamics may not be as extensive as it seems.
If this analysis holds true, it paints a far bleaker picture than Savage’s argument implies. Should the attempts at diversification have led to a significant shift, the backlash against it might be justifiable—a risk worth taking in light of the potential benefits. Instead, what seems to have occurred is a lot of empty rhetoric with little meaningful change, resulting in a backlash that is causing real harm. This scenario represents a troubling conundrum.
